Fiorentini, Gianluca
(1989)
Asymmetric Information in Public Provision Mechanisms.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 17.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5333.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(77).
ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract
An optimal mechanism fot the provision of impure public inputs to oligopolistic firms is investigated using a three stage game where in the first stage the public agency which provides the public input fixes a non-linear price schedule.
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