Delbono, Flavio ; Denicolò, Vincenzo
(1988)
R & D Investment in Oligopoly: Betrand vs Cournot.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 24.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5366.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(48).
ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract
Since the work of Schumpeter, it has been argued that there may exist a trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency. As a contribution to this debate, in this paper we compare the R&D performance of CCournot and Bertrand oligopolists. We model a one-shot noncooperative game in which firms invest in R&D, with the aim of being first in a competition for a patentable cost-reducing innovation.
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