Collusive Vertical Relations

Bolatto, Stefano ; Lambertini, Luca (2017) Collusive Vertical Relations. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 14. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5615. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (1103). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We investigate the possibility for two vertically related firms to at least partially collude on the wholesale price over an infinite horizon to mitigate or eliminate the effects of double marginalisation, thereby avoiding contracts which might not be enforceable. We characterise alternative scenarios envisaging different deviations by the upstream firm and different punishments. This allows us to show that the most efficient case is that in which the upstream firm deviates along its best reply function and the punishment prescribes the disruption of the vertical relation for good after a deviation from the collusive path.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Bolatto, StefanoUniversità di Bologna0000-0003-0937-5258
Lambertini, LucaUniversità di Bologna0000-0001-6353-4753
Parole chiave
collusion, double marginalisation, supply chain, vertical integration
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
05 Lug 2017 15:14
Ultima modifica
15 Feb 2018 10:16
URI

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