Lambertini, Luca ; Tedeschi, Piero
(2003)
Sequential Entry in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/608.
Full text available as:
Preview |
PDF
Download (372kB) | Preview |
Official URL: http://www.dse.unibo.it/wp/492.pdf
Abstract
We analyse a model of vertical differentiation focusing on the trade-off between entering early and exploiting monopoly power with a low quality, versus waiting and enjoying a dominant market position with a superior product. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium where the leader enters with a lower quality than the follower, for low discount factors, for high costs of quality and for low consumers’ willingness to pay for quality.
Abstract
Other metadata
Downloads
Downloads
Staff only:
