Profit Taxation and Capital Accumulation in Dynamic Oligopoly Models

Baldini, Massimo ; Lambertini, Luca (2002) Profit Taxation and Capital Accumulation in Dynamic Oligopoly Models. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/652.
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Abstract

We illustrate two differential oligopoly games using, respectively, the capital accumulation dynamics ` a la Solow-Nerlove-Arrow, and the capital accumulation dynamics ` a la Ramsey. In both settings, we evaluate the effects of (gross) profit taxation, proving that there exist tax rates yielding the same steady state social welfare as under social planning. Contrary to the static approach, our dynamic analysis shows that, in general, profit taxation affects firms’ decisions concerning capital accumulation and sales. In particular, it has procompetitive effects provided that the extent of delegation is large enough.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Baldini, Massimo
Lambertini, Luca
Parole chiave
differential games capital accumulation open-loop equilibria closed-loop equilibria profit taxation
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
DOI
Data di deposito
17 Giu 2004
Ultima modifica
17 Feb 2016 13:59
URI

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