Bolatto, Stefano ; Pignataro, Giuseppe
(2023)
Equity-settled share-based payments and their (stategic) use under asymmetric information.
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Abstract
Share-based payments are of widespread use in today’s economy. Consulting firms are increasingly accepting equity compensation for their services (particularly from startups)
and many governments provide fiscal incentives to support this choice. Likewise, profitsharing licensing is an on-trend business practice by innovative firms and patent holders when transferring their technology to interested adopters. This paper unveils strategic considerations according to which an agent/seller designs its optimal policy in regard to the equity share to request in exchange for its service, technology or trademark. The model assumes a fringe of interested users/customers differentiated by both the support they need from the seller and the value of the underlying relationship; and also holding an informational disadvantage on their own types. Given the seller’s cost configuration, equilibrium outcomes entail entering a profit-sharing relationship either with the hightype customers only; or with all customers, but in this case based on equity-based payment claims that –for rent extraction purposes– are common (i.e., not differentiated) across types.
Abstract
Share-based payments are of widespread use in today’s economy. Consulting firms are increasingly accepting equity compensation for their services (particularly from startups)
and many governments provide fiscal incentives to support this choice. Likewise, profitsharing licensing is an on-trend business practice by innovative firms and patent holders when transferring their technology to interested adopters. This paper unveils strategic considerations according to which an agent/seller designs its optimal policy in regard to the equity share to request in exchange for its service, technology or trademark. The model assumes a fringe of interested users/customers differentiated by both the support they need from the seller and the value of the underlying relationship; and also holding an informational disadvantage on their own types. Given the seller’s cost configuration, equilibrium outcomes entail entering a profit-sharing relationship either with the hightype customers only; or with all customers, but in this case based on equity-based payment claims that –for rent extraction purposes– are common (i.e., not differentiated) across types.
Document type
Preprint
Creators
Keywords
Technology transfer, Profit-sharing licensing, Consulting for equity, Information asymmetry, Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
Subjects
DOI
Deposit date
08 Jun 2023 10:49
Last modified
08 Jun 2023 10:49
URI
Other metadata
Document type
Preprint
Creators
Keywords
Technology transfer, Profit-sharing licensing, Consulting for equity, Information asymmetry, Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
Subjects
DOI
Deposit date
08 Jun 2023 10:49
Last modified
08 Jun 2023 10:49
URI
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