Ecchia, Giulio ; Lambertini, Luca
(1998)
Market Coverage and the Existence of Equilibrium in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/737.
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Official URL: http://www.dse.unibo.it/wp/311.pdf
Abstract
The existence of a pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium in qualities and prices is investigated in a duopoly model of vertical differentiation where quality improvements require a quadratic variable cost. The alternative cases of partial and full market coverage are considered. It is shown that there exists a parameter range where the incentive to decrease differentiation arises for the high-quality firm, preventing firms to reach a pure-strategy duopoly equilibrium.
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