Time Consistency in Games of Timing

Lambertini, Luca (1998) Time Consistency in Games of Timing. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/744.
Full text disponibile come:
[thumbnail of 302.pdf]
Anteprima
Documento PDF
Download (308kB) | Anteprima

Abstract

This paper tackles the issue of choosing roles in duopoly games. First, it is shown that the two necessary (and su¢cient, if both satisfied) conditions for sequential play to emerge at equilibrium are that both leader and follower are at least weakly better off than under simultaneous play. Second, by means of a two-stage game of vertical differentiation, it is shown that if firms can commit to their respective timing decisions, there may exists a case where the leader is not necessarily better off than in the simultaneous equilibrium. Finally, in the absence of any commitment devices, it is proved that the timing choice can be time inconsistent if it is taken before firms proceed to play in both stages taking place in real time.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Parole chiave
extended game sequential play simultaneous play time consistency vertical differentiation
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
DOI
Data di deposito
17 Giu 2004
Ultima modifica
17 Feb 2016 14:03
URI

Altri metadati

Statistica sui download

Statistica sui download

Gestione del documento: Visualizza il documento

^