Endogenous Timing and the Choice of Quality in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly

Lambertini, Luca (1998) Endogenous Timing and the Choice of Quality in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/751.
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Abstract

The endogenous choice of timing is discussed in a vertically differentiated duopoly where quality improvement requires a fixed convex cost. The timing decision concerns the quality stage. Using an extended game with observable delay, it is shown that only simultaneous equilibria can arise. This puts into question the ability of Stackelberg games to describe the entry process.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Parole chiave
product quality R&D investment timing extended game
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
DOI
Data di deposito
17 Giu 2004
Ultima modifica
17 Feb 2016 14:03
URI

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