Price vs quantity in a duopoly supergame with nash punishments

Baldelli, Serena ; Lambertini, Luca (2004) Price vs quantity in a duopoly supergame with nash punishments. p. 21. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/1548.
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Abstract

We examine the endogenous choice between price and quantity behaviour in a duopoly supergame with product differentiation. We find that (i) if cartel profits are evenly split between firms, then only symmetric equilibria obtains; (i) if instead the additional profits available through collusion are split according to the Nash bargaining solution, there are parameter regions where all subgame perfect equilibria are asymmetric, with firms colluding in price-quantity supergames.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Baldelli, Serena
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
repeated games, collusion, product differentiation
Subjects
DOI
Deposit date
15 Feb 2006
Last modified
17 Feb 2016 14:32
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