Price vs quantity in a duopoly supergame with nash punishments

Baldelli, Serena ; Lambertini, Luca (2004) Price vs quantity in a duopoly supergame with nash punishments. p. 21. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/1548.
Full text disponibile come:
[thumbnail of 510.pdf]
Anteprima
 Documento PDF
Download (225kB) | Anteprima

Abstract

We examine the endogenous choice between price and quantity behaviour in a duopoly supergame with product differentiation. We find that (i) if cartel profits are evenly split between firms, then only symmetric equilibria obtains; (i) if instead the additional profits available through collusion are split according to the Nash bargaining solution, there are parameter regions where all subgame perfect equilibria are asymmetric, with firms colluding in price-quantity supergames.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Baldelli, Serena
Lambertini, Luca
Parole chiave
repeated games, collusion, product differentiation
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
Area 13 - Scienze economiche e statistiche > SECS-P/05 Econometria
DOI
10.6092/unibo/amsacta/1548
Data di deposito
15 Feb 2006
Ultima modifica
17 Feb 2016 14:32
URI
https://amsacta.unibo.it/id/eprint/1548

Altri metadati

Statistica sui download

Statistica sui download

Vedi altre statistiche

Gestione del documento: Visualizza il documento

© ALMA MATER STUDIORUM - Università d Bologna, 2007-2024.

^