Paying not to sell

Bacchiega, Emanuele ; Bonroy, Olivier ; Mabrouk, Rania (2013) Paying not to sell. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 10. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/3893. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (870). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the good produced by that firm.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Bacchiega, Emanuele
Bonroy, Olivier
Mabrouk, Rania
Keywords
Monopoly, Vertical product differentiation, Vertical relationships
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
05 Dec 2013 09:30
Last modified
19 Feb 2014 08:43
URI

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