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Bacchiega, Emanuele ; Bonroy, Olivier ; Mabrouk, Rania
(2013)
Paying not to sell.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 10.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/3893.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(870).
ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract
In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the good produced by that firm.
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