On the coevolution of social norms in primitive societies

Bagnoli, Lidia ; Negroni, Giorgio (2012) On the coevolution of social norms in primitive societies. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 39. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/3907. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (858). ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text available as:
[img]
Preview
PDF
License: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial

Download (482kB) | Preview

Abstract

Two parties bargaining over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Two games are considered. In both, bargaining proceeds according to the Nash Demand Game when a symmetric investments profile is observed. When, on the other hand, an asymmetric investments profile is observed, we assume that bargaining proceeds according to the Ultimatum Game in one case and according to a Dictator Game in the other. We hereby show that in both games when a unique stochastically stable outcome exists it supports an homogeneous behavior in the whole population both at the investment stage and at the distribution stage. A norm of investment and a norm of division must therefore coevolve in the two games, supporting both the efficient investment profile and the egalitarian distribution of the surplus, respectively. The two games differ depending on the conditions needed for the two norms to coevolve. The games are proposed to explain the social norms used in modern hunter-gatherer societies.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Bagnoli, Lidia
Negroni, Giorgio
Keywords
evolution, social norms, stochastically stable equilibrium, modern hunter-gatherer societies
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
12 Dec 2013 14:10
Last modified
19 Feb 2014 08:52
URI

Other metadata

Downloads

Downloads

Staff only: View the document

^