Equilibrium Innovation Ecosystems: The Dark Side of Collaborating with Complementors

Mantovani, Andrea ; Ruiz-Aliseda, Francisco (2012) Equilibrium Innovation Ecosystems: The Dark Side of Collaborating with Complementors. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 26. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4189. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (825). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

The recent years have exhibited a burst in the amount of collaborative activities among firms selling complementary products. This paper aims at providing a rationale for such a large extent of collaboration ties among complementors. To this end, we analyze a game in which the two producers of a certain component have the possibility to form pairwise collaboration ties with each of the two producers of a complementary component. Once ties are formed, each of the four firms decides how much to invest in improving the quality of the match with each possible complementor, under the assumption that collaborating with a complementor makes it cheaper to invest in enhancing match quality with such complementor. Once investment choices have taken place, all firms choose prices for their respective components. Our main finding in this setting is that firms end up forming as many collaboration ties as it is possible, although they would all prefer a scenario where collaboration were forbidden, unlike a social planner.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Mantovani, Andrea
Ruiz-Aliseda, Francisco
Keywords
Systems Competition, Complementary Products, Interoperability, Collaboration Link, Co-opetition, Exclusivity
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
18 Mar 2015 13:54
Last modified
31 Mar 2015 13:25
URI

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