Competition, Reputation and Compliance

Vanin, Paolo (2009) Competition, Reputation and Compliance. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 19. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4562. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (682). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

This paper displays a linear demand oligopoly model, in which firms endogenously decide whether to enter the market and whether to specialize on high or low quality products, and then repeatedly interact to sell experience goods. It shows that the intuition that low and rising prices grant compliance with quality promises extends to this setting, provided that high quality is sufficiently important to buyers.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Vanin, Paolo
Parole chiave
Oligopoly, Quality, Price Signals, Consumers' Trust
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
05 Feb 2016 11:27
Ultima modifica
05 Feb 2016 11:27
URI

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