Competition, Reputation and Compliance

Vanin, Paolo (2009) Competition, Reputation and Compliance. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 19. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4562. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (682). ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text available as:
[img]
Preview
PDF
License: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial

Download (208kB) | Preview

Abstract

This paper displays a linear demand oligopoly model, in which firms endogenously decide whether to enter the market and whether to specialize on high or low quality products, and then repeatedly interact to sell experience goods. It shows that the intuition that low and rising prices grant compliance with quality promises extends to this setting, provided that high quality is sufficiently important to buyers.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Vanin, Paolo
Keywords
Oligopoly, Quality, Price Signals, Consumers' Trust
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
05 Feb 2016 11:27
Last modified
05 Feb 2016 11:27
URI

Other metadata

Downloads

Downloads

Staff only: View the document

^