Weak and Strong Time Consistency in Differential Oligopoly Games with Capital Accumulation

Cellini, Roberto ; Lambertini, Luca (2005) Weak and Strong Time Consistency in Differential Oligopoly Games with Capital Accumulation. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 20. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4745. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (544). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We illustrate two differential oligopoly games with capital accumulation where, alternatively, the accumulation dynamics of productive capacity is modelled either `a la Solow—Swan or `a la Ramsey. We show that in the first case the open-loop Nash equilibrium is only weakly time consistent, while in the second it is strongly so, although the Ramsey game is not state linear.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Cellini, Roberto
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
differential games, capital accumulation, open-loop equilibria, closed-loop equilibria
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
01 Apr 2016 09:28
Last modified
01 Apr 2016 09:28
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