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Cellini, Roberto ; Lambertini, Luca
(2005)
Weak and Strong Time Consistency in Differential Oligopoly Games with Capital Accumulation.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 20.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4745.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(544).
ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract
We illustrate two differential oligopoly games with capital accumulation where, alternatively, the accumulation dynamics of productive capacity is modelled either `a la Solow—Swan or `a la Ramsey. We show that in the first case the open-loop Nash equilibrium is only weakly time consistent, while in the second it is strongly so, although the Ramsey game is not state linear.
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