Degenerate Feedback and Time Consistency in Dynamic Games

Cellini, Roberto ; Lambertini, Luca ; Leitmann, George (2005) Degenerate Feedback and Time Consistency in Dynamic Games. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 19. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4755. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (535). ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text available as:
[img]
Preview
Text(pdf)
License: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial

Download (208kB) | Preview

Abstract

This paper analyses the time consistency of open-loop equilibria, in the cases of Nash and Stackelberg behaviour. We define a class of games where the strong time-consistency of the open-loop Nash equilibrium associates with the time consistency of the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium. We label these games as `perfect uncontrollable' and provide two examples based on (i) a model where firms invest so as to increase consumers' reservation prices, based upon Cellini and Lambertini (CEJOR, 2003); and (ii) a model where firms compete to increase their respective market shares, based upon Leit- mann and Schmitendorf (IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 1978).

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Cellini, Roberto
Lambertini, Luca
Leitmann, George
Keywords
differential games, open-loop equilibria, time consistency, subgame perfection
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
18 Mar 2016 10:14
Last modified
18 Mar 2016 10:15
URI

Other metadata

Downloads

Downloads

Staff only: View the document

^