R&D Incentives under Bertrand Competition: A Differential Game

Cellini, Roberto ; Lambertini, Luca (2004) R&D Incentives under Bertrand Competition: A Differential Game. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 15. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4771. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (519). ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text available as:
[img]
Preview
Text(pdf)
License: Creative Commons Attribution

Download (168kB) | Preview

Abstract

We investigate dynamic R&D for process innovation in an oligopoly where firms invest in cost-reducing activities. We focus on the relationship between R&D intensity and market structure, proving that the industry R&D investment monotonically increases in the number of firms. This result contradicts the established wisdom acquired from static games on the same topic. We also prove that, if competition is suficiently tough, any increase in product substitutability reduces R&D efforts.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Cellini, Roberto
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
differential games, price competition, process innovation, spillovers
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
10 Mar 2016 10:37
Last modified
10 Mar 2016 10:37
URI

Other metadata

Downloads

Downloads

Staff only: View the document

^