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Cellini, Roberto ; Lambertini, Luca
(2004)
R&D Incentives under Bertrand Competition: A Differential Game.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 15.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4771.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(519).
ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract
We investigate dynamic R&D for process innovation in an oligopoly where firms invest in cost-reducing activities. We focus on the relationship between R&D intensity and market structure, proving that the industry R&D investment monotonically increases in the number of firms. This result contradicts the established wisdom acquired from static games on the same topic. We also prove that, if competition is suficiently tough, any increase in product substitutability reduces R&D efforts.
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