Dynamic R&D with Spillovers: Competition vs Cooperation

Cellini, Roberto ; Lambertini, Luca (2003) Dynamic R&D with Spillovers: Competition vs Cooperation. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 24. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4799. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (495). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We investigate dynamic R&D for process innovation in a duopoly where firms may either undertake independent ventures or form a cartel for cost-reducing R&D investments. By comparing the profit and welfare perfomances of the two settings in steady state, we show that private and social incentives towards R&D cooperation coincide for all admissible levels of the technological spillovers characterising innovative activity. This results stems from smoothing the investment reffort over the time horizon of the game.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Cellini, Roberto
Lambertini, Luca
Parole chiave
differential games, process innovation, R&D cooperation, spillovers
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
09 Mar 2016 15:09
Ultima modifica
09 Mar 2016 15:09
URI

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