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Cellini, Roberto ; Lambertini, Luca
(2003)
Dynamic R&D with Spillovers: Competition vs Cooperation.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 24.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4799.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(495).
ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract
We investigate dynamic R&D for process innovation in a duopoly where firms may either undertake independent ventures or form a cartel for cost-reducing R&D investments. By comparing the profit and welfare perfomances of the two settings in steady state, we show that private and social incentives towards R&D cooperation coincide for all admissible levels of the technological spillovers characterising innovative activity. This results stems from smoothing the investment reffort over the time horizon of the game.
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