Stackelberg Leadership in a Dynamic Duopoly with Capital Accumulation.

Lambertini, Luca (2002) Stackelberg Leadership in a Dynamic Duopoly with Capital Accumulation. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 14. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4856. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (442). ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text available as:
[img]
Preview
Text(pdf)
License: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial

Download (232kB) | Preview

Abstract

I propose a dynamic duopoly model where firms enter simultaneously but compete hierarchically à la Stackelberg at each instant over time. They accumulate capacity through costly investment, as in Solow’s (1956) growth model.The leader invests more than the followersò as a result, in steady state the leader’s capacity and profits are larger than the follower`s Therefore, the present analysis does not confirm Gibrat`s Law, since the individual growth rate is determined by the timing of moves.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
differential games, investment, optimal control methods, Stackelberg equiibrium
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
14 Mar 2016 15:42
Last modified
14 Mar 2016 15:42
URI

Other metadata

Downloads

Downloads

Staff only: View the document

^