Independent Auditors as Fiscal Gatekeepers

Franzoni, Luigi Alberto (1996) Independent Auditors as Fiscal Gatekeepers. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 28. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5024. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (286). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

This paper develops a framework for the analysis of gatekeeping in tax enforcement, whereby independent auditors are assigned the duty of certifying taxpayers` reports. The equilibrium of the market for gatekeepers` services is characterized, as well as taxpayers` and auditors` optimal behavior. The paper discusses the optimal structure of the gatekeeping regime and determines the conditions under which it is socially preferable to direct public enforcement.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Franzoni, Luigi Alberto
Keywords
Law enforcement, tax evasion, auditing, collateral liability, certificatio.
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
05 Apr 2016 08:03
Last modified
05 Apr 2016 08:03
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