Independent Auditors as Fiscal Gatekeepers

Franzoni, Luigi Alberto (1996) Independent Auditors as Fiscal Gatekeepers. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 28. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5024. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (286). ISSN 2282-6483.

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Abstract

This paper develops a framework for the analysis of gatekeeping in tax enforcement, whereby independent auditors are assigned the duty of certifying taxpayers` reports. The equilibrium of the market for gatekeepers` services is characterized, as well as taxpayers` and auditors` optimal behavior. The paper discusses the optimal structure of the gatekeeping regime and determines the conditions under which it is socially preferable to direct public enforcement.

Abstract

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Monografia (Working paper)

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