Independent Auditors as Fiscal Gatekeepers

Franzoni, Luigi Alberto (1996) Independent Auditors as Fiscal Gatekeepers. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 28. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5024. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (286). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

This paper develops a framework for the analysis of gatekeeping in tax enforcement, whereby independent auditors are assigned the duty of certifying taxpayers` reports. The equilibrium of the market for gatekeepers` services is characterized, as well as taxpayers` and auditors` optimal behavior. The paper discusses the optimal structure of the gatekeeping regime and determines the conditions under which it is socially preferable to direct public enforcement.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Franzoni, Luigi Alberto
Parole chiave
Law enforcement, tax evasion, auditing, collateral liability, certificatio.
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
Area 13 - Scienze economiche e statistiche > SECS-P/03 Scienza delle finanze
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5024
Data di deposito
05 Apr 2016 08:03
Ultima modifica
05 Apr 2016 08:03
URI
https://amsacta.unibo.it/id/eprint/5024

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