Cartel Stability Under Vertical Differentiation and Convex costs: Bertrand vs Cournot

Lambertini, Luca (1996) Cartel Stability Under Vertical Differentiation and Convex costs: Bertrand vs Cournot. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 23. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5051. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (259). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

The issue of a cartel stability is investigated in a vertical differentiation framework with convex variable production costs. The behaviour of firms' critical discount factors as the curvature of the cost function varies is analysed, considering either the noncooperative or cooperative qualities, and either price or quantity behaviour. It emerges that, if firms aim at stabilizing the cartel, they are better off paying à la Counot and prefer not to choose the monopoly qualities.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Parole chiave
vertical differentation, collusion, cartel stability
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
04 Apr 2016 09:23
Ultima modifica
04 Apr 2016 09:23
URI

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