Sequential Vs Simultaneous Equilibria in a Differentiated Duopoly

Lambertini, Luca (1996) Sequential Vs Simultaneous Equilibria in a Differentiated Duopoly. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 17. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5061. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (249). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

This paper tackles the issue of choosing roles in differentiated duopoly games. First, it is shown that the leader is not necessarily better off than in the simultaneous equilibrium. Second, it is proved that the sequential equilibria obtain only if both firms are better off under sequential play than under simultaneous play. Finally, a duopoly game under vertical differentiation and Bertrand competition is illustrated, where the price leader can indeed happen to be worse off than in the simultaneous equilibrium.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
extended game, sequential play, simultaneous play, vertical differentiation
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
04 Apr 2016 15:04
Last modified
04 Apr 2016 15:04
URI

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