Choosing Roles under Supply Function Competition

Delbono, Flavio ; Lambertini, Luca (2016) Choosing Roles under Supply Function Competition. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 19. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5173. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (1069). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We investigate an extended game with observable delay under duopolistic competition in affine supply functions. Firms use the intercepts of supply functions as their strategic variables. Best replies are downward (upward) sloping if the common slope of supply functions is sufficiently low (high). Accordingly, simultaneous (sequential) play is selected at the subgame perfect equilibrium when best replies are negatively (positively) sloped. There exists a unique value of the slope at which best replies are orthogonal and the choice between simultaneous and sequential play is immaterial.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Delbono, Flavio0000-0001-9030-4048
Lambertini, Luca0000-0001-6353-4753
Parole chiave
supply function, strategic complements, strategic substitutes, endogenous timing
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
07 Giu 2016 13:27
Ultima modifica
08 Mag 2017 13:17
URI

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