Choosing Roles under Supply Function Competition

Delbono, Flavio ; Lambertini, Luca (2016) Choosing Roles under Supply Function Competition. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 19. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5173. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (1069). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We investigate an extended game with observable delay under duopolistic competition in affine supply functions. Firms use the intercepts of supply functions as their strategic variables. Best replies are downward (upward) sloping if the common slope of supply functions is sufficiently low (high). Accordingly, simultaneous (sequential) play is selected at the subgame perfect equilibrium when best replies are negatively (positively) sloped. There exists a unique value of the slope at which best replies are orthogonal and the choice between simultaneous and sequential play is immaterial.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Delbono, Flavio0000-0001-9030-4048
Lambertini, Luca0000-0001-6353-4753
Keywords
supply function, strategic complements, strategic substitutes, endogenous timing
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
07 Jun 2016 13:27
Last modified
08 May 2017 13:17
URI

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