Equilibrium Locations in the Unconstrained Hotelling Game

Lambertini, Luca (1993) Equilibrium Locations in the Unconstrained Hotelling Game. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 11. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5202. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (155). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

In this paper, we try to analyse the optimal location choice in a standard game of horizontal differentiation in which firms are free to locate outside the city boundaries. It turns out that the unique Nash equilibium exhibits a finite distance between the sellers, so that the maximum differentiation principle is not confirmed. Moreover, the two symmetric Stackelberg equilibria exhibit the same degree of differentiation observed when the game is non cooperatively played within the city, except that the leader locates at the center.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca0000-0001-6353-4753
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ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
15 Jun 2016 09:13
Last modified
15 Jun 2016 09:13
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