Fixed Agenda Social Choice Theory: Correspondence and Impossibility Theorems for Social Choice Corrispondences and Social Decision Functions

Denicolò, Vincenzo (1989) Fixed Agenda Social Choice Theory: Correspondence and Impossibility Theorems for Social Choice Corrispondences and Social Decision Functions. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 16. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5282. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (84). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is concerned with the problem of finding a collective choice rule which selects one or more alternatives from every non emplty subset of the universal set of alternatives.

Abstract
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Monograph (Working Paper)
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CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Denicolò, Vincenzo0000-0001-8371-4241
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ISSN
2282-6483
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11 Jul 2016 14:28
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11 Jul 2016 14:28
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