Citizens or lobbies: who controls policy?

Roberti, Paolo (2016) Citizens or lobbies: who controls policy? Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 32. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5454. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (1085). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

This paper analyses a model of electoral competition with lobbying, where candidates hold private information about their willingness to pander to lobbies, if elected. I show that this uncertainty induces risk-averse voters to choose candidates who implement policies biased in favor of the lobby. Increasing the prior probability of non-pandering candidates can increase the effect of lobbying. If, however, the cost of running for office is sufficiently large, there is no effect of lobbying on policy. The model thus demonstrates that uncertainty on the influence of special interests can lead to large effects of lobbying on policy.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Roberti, PaoloUniversità di Bologna0000-0002-2577-0154
Keywords
voting, lobbying, citizen-candidate
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
07 Dec 2016 09:48
Last modified
07 Jun 2017 09:13
URI

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