Citizens or lobbies: who controls policy?

Roberti, Paolo (2016) Citizens or lobbies: who controls policy? Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 32. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5454. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (1085). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

This paper analyses a model of electoral competition with lobbying, where candidates hold private information about their willingness to pander to lobbies, if elected. I show that this uncertainty induces risk-averse voters to choose candidates who implement policies biased in favor of the lobby. Increasing the prior probability of non-pandering candidates can increase the effect of lobbying. If, however, the cost of running for office is sufficiently large, there is no effect of lobbying on policy. The model thus demonstrates that uncertainty on the influence of special interests can lead to large effects of lobbying on policy.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Roberti, PaoloUniversità di Bologna0000-0002-2577-0154
Parole chiave
voting, lobbying, citizen-candidate
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
07 Dic 2016 09:48
Ultima modifica
07 Giu 2017 09:13
URI

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