Would you like to enter first with a low-quality good?

Lambertini, Luca ; Tedeschi, Piero (2003) Would you like to enter first with a low-quality good? DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/606.
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Abstract

Using a two-period duopoly model with vertical differentiation, we show that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where the first entrant supplies a lower quality and gains higher profits than the second entrant. We also prove that this entry sequence is also socially efficient.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Tedeschi, Piero
Keywords
entry vertical differentiation
Subjects
DOI
Deposit date
17 Jun 2004
Last modified
17 Feb 2016 13:58
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