Would you like to enter first with a low-quality good?

Lambertini, Luca ; Tedeschi, Piero (2003) Would you like to enter first with a low-quality good? DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/606.

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URL ufficiale: http://www.dse.unibo.it/wp/494.pdf

Abstract

Using a two-period duopoly model with vertical differentiation, we show that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where the first entrant supplies a lower quality and gains higher profits than the second entrant. We also prove that this entry sequence is also socially efficient.

Abstract

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Monografia (Working paper)

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