Price vs Quantity in a Repeated Differentiated Duopoly

Lambertini, Luca ; Schultz, Christian (2000) Price vs Quantity in a Repeated Differentiated Duopoly. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/695.
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Abstract

We investigate the choice of market variable, price or quantity, of an opti-mal implicit cartel. If the discount factor is high, the cartel can realize the monopoly profit in both cases. Otherwise, it is optimal for the cartel to rely on quantities in the collusive phase if goods are substitutes and prices if goods are complements. The reason is that this minimizes the gains from deviations from collusive play.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Schultz, Christian
Keywords
partial collusion product differentiation
Subjects
DOI
Deposit date
17 Jun 2004
Last modified
17 Feb 2016 14:01
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