Delegation and Cartel Stability

Lambertini, Luca (1994) Delegation and Cartel Stability. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/808.
Full text disponibile come:
[thumbnail of 208.pdf]
Anteprima
Documento PDF
Download (35kB) | Anteprima

Abstract

The effect of delegation on cartel stability is addressed in a duopoly for a homogeneous product, under Cournot competition. The main findings are that if only one firm is managerial, the critical discount factor is increased by the presence of a weight attached to sales, so that cartel stability is decreased, while if both are managerial the opposite holds. As a consequence, the inclusion of sales in both firms’ objective function represents an incentive towards collusion.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
DOI
Data di deposito
17 Giu 2004
Ultima modifica
17 Feb 2016 14:05
URI

Altri metadati

Statistica sui download

Statistica sui download

Gestione del documento: Visualizza il documento

^