Paying not to sell

Bacchiega, Emanuele ; Bonroy, Olivier ; Mabrouk, Rania (2013) Paying not to sell. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 10. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/3893. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (870). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the good produced by that firm.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Bacchiega, Emanuele
Bonroy, Olivier
Mabrouk, Rania
Parole chiave
Monopoly, Vertical product differentiation, Vertical relationships
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
05 Dic 2013 09:30
Ultima modifica
19 Feb 2014 08:43
URI

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