The emergence of norms of cooperation in stag hunt games with production

Bagnoli, Lidia ; Negroni, Giorgio (2008) The emergence of norms of cooperation in stag hunt games with production. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 41. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4624. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (626). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

In this paper we study a two agents asymmetric stag hunt game. The model has an infinity of strict, Pareto rankable Nash equilibria. The equilibrium selection problem is solved by appealing to the stochastic stability concept put forward by Young (1993). We prove two main results. When the action sets are numerable in.nite sets, then for any value of the distributive parameter we can expect the emergence of a norm involving less than maximal cooperation. When instead the action sets are finite sets of a particular type (in the sense that each agent can choose his maximum optimal effort and fractions of this), then for some value of the distributive parameter we can expect the emergence of a norm involving maximal cooperation.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Bagnoli, Lidia
Negroni, Giorgio
Parole chiave
asymmetric stag hunt game; stochastic stability; cooper- ation norms
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
16 Feb 2016 15:08
Ultima modifica
16 Feb 2016 15:08
URI

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