Denicolò, Vincenzo
(1996)
Equity, Envy and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 5.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5067.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(242).
ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract
We show that any social choice function that always selects envy-free Pareto efficient allocations must violate Arrow's condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives.
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