Price vs Quantity in a Duopoly with Technological Spillovers: A Welfare Re-Appraisal

Lambertini, Luca ; Mantovani, Andrea (2000) Price vs Quantity in a Duopoly with Technological Spillovers: A Welfare Re-Appraisal. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/685.
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Abstract

We analyse the problem of the choice of the market variable in a model where firms activate R&D investments for process innovation. We establish that (i) firms always choose the Cournot behaviour; and (ii) there exists a set of the relevant parameters where a benevolent social planner prefers quantity setting to price setting. This happens when the marginal cost of R&D activities is relatively low while technological externalities are relatively high. In this situation, the conflict between social and private preferences over the type of market behaviour disappears.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Mantovani, Andrea
Parole chiave
price quantity R&D, spillovers
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
DOI
Data di deposito
17 Giu 2004
Ultima modifica
17 Feb 2016 14:00
URI

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