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Denicolò, Vincenzo
(1989)
Fixed Agenda Social Choice Theory: Correspondence and Impossibility Theorems for Social Choice Corrispondences and Social Decision Functions.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 16.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5282.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(84).
ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is concerned with the problem of finding a collective choice rule which selects one or more alternatives from every non emplty subset of the universal set of alternatives.
Abstract
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