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Abstract
We consider a start-up firm which applies for a bank loan to implement a project based on
complementary activities. The firm has the possibility to improve the complementarity effect
by coordinating the activities. Coordination is costly and can be made either by using internal
human resources or by hiring a consulting firm. In the former case the choice of coordination
is not verifiable by the bank and a moral hazard problem arises, while in the latter information
is symmetric. The role of consulting services is thus to mitigate the informational problem.
Without consulting, the firm does not coordinate and either obtains no funding or the surplus
of the project is not maximized.
Abstract
We consider a start-up firm which applies for a bank loan to implement a project based on
complementary activities. The firm has the possibility to improve the complementarity effect
by coordinating the activities. Coordination is costly and can be made either by using internal
human resources or by hiring a consulting firm. In the former case the choice of coordination
is not verifiable by the bank and a moral hazard problem arises, while in the latter information
is symmetric. The role of consulting services is thus to mitigate the informational problem.
Without consulting, the firm does not coordinate and either obtains no funding or the surplus
of the project is not maximized.
Tipologia del documento
Monografia
(Working paper)
Autori
Parole chiave
complementarity, inside and outside coordination, moral hazard
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
DOI
Data di deposito
15 Feb 2006
Ultima modifica
17 Feb 2016 14:31
URI
Altri metadati
Tipologia del documento
Monografia
(Working paper)
Autori
Parole chiave
complementarity, inside and outside coordination, moral hazard
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
DOI
Data di deposito
15 Feb 2006
Ultima modifica
17 Feb 2016 14:31
URI
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