Complementarity, coordination, and credit

Alessandro, Fedele ; Mantovani, Andrea (2004) Complementarity, coordination, and credit. p. 21. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/1508.
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Abstract

We consider a start-up firm which applies for a bank loan to implement a project based on complementary activities. The firm has the possibility to improve the complementarity effect by coordinating the activities. Coordination is costly and can be made either by using internal human resources or by hiring a consulting firm. In the former case the choice of coordination is not verifiable by the bank and a moral hazard problem arises, while in the latter information is symmetric. The role of consulting services is thus to mitigate the informational problem. Without consulting, the firm does not coordinate and either obtains no funding or the surplus of the project is not maximized.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Alessandro, Fedele
Mantovani, Andrea
Keywords
complementarity, inside and outside coordination, moral hazard
Subjects
DOI
Deposit date
15 Feb 2006
Last modified
17 Feb 2016 14:31
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