Weak and strong time consistency in differential oligopoly games with capital accumulation

Cellini, Roberto ; Lambertini, Luca (2005) Weak and strong time consistency in differential oligopoly games with capital accumulation. p. 22. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/1792.

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Abstract

We illustrate two differential oligopoly games with capital accumulation where, alternatively, the accumulation dynamics of productive capacity is modelled either à la Solow—Swan or à la Ramsey. We show that in the first case the open-loop Nash equilibrium is only weakly time consistent, while in the second it is strongly so, although the Ramsey game is not state linear.

Abstract

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