Temporary Workers Are Not Free-Riders: An Experimental Investigation

Dragone, Davide ; Galeotti, Fabio ; Orsini, Raimondello (2013) Temporary Workers Are Not Free-Riders: An Experimental Investigation. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 40. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/3902. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (915). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We conduct an artefactual field experiment to study whether the individual preferences and propensity to cooperate of temporary workers differ from permanent contract workers. We find that temporary and permanent contract workers have different other-regarding preferences, but display similar contribution patterns in an anonymous Public Good Game. Students, instead, are more selfish and contribute less than temporary and permanent workers.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Dragone, Davide
Galeotti, Fabio
Orsini, Raimondello
Parole chiave
Temporary Worker, Decomposed Prisoner Dilemma, Dictator Game, Public Good Game, Field Experiment
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
Area 13 - Scienze economiche e statistiche > SECS-P/01 Economia politica
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
10.6092/unibo/amsacta/3902
Data di deposito
11 Dic 2013 12:12
Ultima modifica
10 Feb 2014 10:43
URI
https://amsacta.unibo.it/id/eprint/3902

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