Inverted-U aggregate investment curves in a dynamic game of advertising

Lambertini, Luca ; Zaccour, Georges (2014) Inverted-U aggregate investment curves in a dynamic game of advertising. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche, p. 21. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4047. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (954). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We revisit the relationship between market power and firms' investment incentives in a noncooperative differential oligopoly game in which firms sell differentiated goods and invest in advertising to increase the brand equity of their respective goods. The feedback equilibrium obtains under open-loop rules, and aggregate expenditure on goodwill takes an inverted-U shape under both Cournot and Bertrand behaviour, provided product differentiation is sufficiently high. Total industry expenditure is higher under Cournot competition.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Zaccour, Georges
Parole chiave
Goodwill, Oligopoly, Advertising, Differential games, Schumpeterian hypothesis
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
Area 13 - Scienze economiche e statistiche > SECS-P/01 Economia politica
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4047
Data di deposito
10 Lug 2014 15:22
Ultima modifica
16 Mar 2015 14:56
URI
https://amsacta.unibo.it/id/eprint/4047

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