On price competition with market share delegation contracts

Lambertini, Luca ; Kopel, Michael (2012) On price competition with market share delegation contracts. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 11. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4212. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (806). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We identify a mistake in the specification of the demand system used in the strategic delegation model based on market shares by Jansen et al. (2007), whereby the price remains above marginal cost when goods are homogeneous. After amending this aspect, we perform a profit comparison with the alternative delegation scheme à la Fershtman and Judd (1987)

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Kopel, Michael
Parole chiave
delegation, managerial arms, Bertrand competition
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
Area 13 - Scienze economiche e statistiche > SECS-P/01 Economia politica
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4212
Data di deposito
30 Mar 2015 13:17
Ultima modifica
31 Mar 2015 13:46
URI
https://amsacta.unibo.it/id/eprint/4212

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