On the Observational Equivalence of Unilateral Delegation Contracts in Duopoly

Lambertini, Luca ; Delbono, Flavio (2015) On the Observational Equivalence of Unilateral Delegation Contracts in Duopoly. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 12. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4361. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (1033). ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text disponibile come:
[thumbnail of WP1033.pdf]
Anteprima
 Documento PDF
Licenza: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial 3.0 (CC BY-NC 3.0)
Download (319kB) | Anteprima

Abstract

In a Cournot duopoly, if only one firm hires a manager while the other remains entrepreneurial, the Cournot-Stackelberg equilibrium emerges, with the managerial firm as the leader. This happens under at least three different delegation schemes. We illustrate the different meachanisms driving this outcome through the analysis of the map of best replies at the market stage.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Delbono, Flavio
Parole chiave
delegation, comparative performance, market share, sales, Cournot competition
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
Area 13 - Scienze economiche e statistiche > SECS-P/01 Economia politica
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4361
Data di deposito
06 Ott 2015 12:49
Ultima modifica
23 Ott 2015 09:28
URI
https://amsacta.unibo.it/id/eprint/4361

Altri metadati

Statistica sui download

Statistica sui download

Vedi altre statistiche

Gestione del documento: Visualizza il documento

© ALMA MATER STUDIORUM - Università d Bologna, 2007-2024.

^