When Do Groups Perform Better than Individuals? A Company Takeover Experiment

Casari, Marco ; Zhang, Jingjing ; Jackson, Christine (2011) When Do Groups Perform Better than Individuals? A Company Takeover Experiment. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 53. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4478. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (763). ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text disponibile come:
[thumbnail of WP763.pdf]
Anteprima
Documento PDF
Licenza: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial 3.0 (CC BY-NC 3.0)

Download (475kB) | Anteprima

Abstract

It is still an open question when groups will perform better than individuals in intellectual tasks. We report that in a company takeover experiment, groups placed better bids than individuals and substantially reduced the winner’s curse. This improvement was mostly due to peer pressure over the minority opinion and to group learning. Learning took place from interacting and negotiating consensus with others, not simply from observing their bids. When there was disagreement within a group, what prevailed was not the best proposal but the one of the majority. Groups underperformed with respect to a “truth wins” benchmark although they outperformed individuals deciding in isolation.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Casari, Marco
Zhang, Jingjing
Jackson, Christine
Parole chiave
winner's curse, takeover game, group decision making, communication, experiments
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
28 Gen 2016 11:36
Ultima modifica
28 Gen 2016 11:36
URI

Altri metadati

Statistica sui download

Statistica sui download

Gestione del documento: Visualizza il documento

^